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The Birth and Persistence of  
the Katyn Lie 
Witold Wasilewski* 
As a result of the German invasion of Poland in September 
1, 1939 and then the Soviet invasion on September 17, half of 
Poland’s territory came under Soviet rule. In the spring of 
1940, the Soviets murdered about 22,000 Polish officers—
including prisoners of war and high-profile citizens—in Katyn 
and in other locations. After the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union on April 13, 1943, Radio Berlin announced the discovery 
of the bodies of Polish officers killed by Bolsheviks in the Katyn 
region. On April 15, 1943 Radio Moscow published a 
communiqué from the Soviet Information Bureau that blamed 
the Germans for the massacre of Polish officers. This 
communiqué gave birth to the false Soviet version of the murder 
of Polish prisoners of war, which became known as the Katyn 
lie. In the subsequent months the Katyn lie was reinforced by 
fabricated “evidence” provided by the Soviet security 
departments NKVD and NKGB. In early 1944, the Special State 
Commission, headed by Nikolai Budenko, presented to the world 
the complete official Soviet version of the atrocities against 
Poles. After World War II, the Soviet fabrication was 
perpetuated and spread to all countries of the communist bloc 
and to many circles in the west. This article details the spread 
of the Katyn lie, as uncovered through newly available 
documents in official Russian historical archives. 
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I. Introduction 
In the spring of 1940, pursuant to a March 5th order of the 
Political Bureau of the VCP (b), the People’s Commissariat for 
Internal Affairs (NKVD) murdered about 22,000 Polish prisoners of 
war and other Polish citizens that had been arrested in the Polish 
territories annexed to the Soviet Union.1 The victims were mainly 
Polish military officers.2 The Katyn Forest was one the various 
locations of their execution. 
The truth about the Katyn massacre came from an unexpected 
source. In the early spring of 1943, after information from the local 
population and an informal investigation, German authorities decided 
to search the Katyn Forest.3 The search led to the discovery of the 
bodies of the murdered Polish officers, the last piece of evidence 
linking the NKVD to the murders. After the defeat at Stalingrad, 
Joseph Goebbels, interested in undermining the credibility of the 
Soviet Union, began a propaganda offensive. On April 13, 1943, Radio 
Berlin announced that German authorities discovered the bodies of 
Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.4 This news 
generated wide interest throughout the world.5 Delegations—including 
journalists from the occupied and neutral countries, allied officers held 
 
1. Matthew Day, US ‘Hushed Up Katyn Massacre’, TELEGRAPH (UK), 
Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/Europe/ 
poland/9535828/US-hushed-up-Katyn-massacre.html. 
2. Benjamin B. Fischer, The Katyn Controversy: Stalin’s Killing Field, 
CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/ 
csi-publications/ csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art6.html (last updated 
June 27, 2008).  
3. See Inessa Jazhborovskaya, The Katyn Case: Working to Learn the 
Truth, RUSS. ACAD. SCI. SOC. SCI., 2011, at 34–35.  
4. 149 CONG. REC. 8,556 (statement of Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski).  
5. KATYŃ : DOKUMENTY ZBRODNI. T. 4, ECHA KATYNIA : KWIECIEŃ 1943 - 
MARZEC 2005 [KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME,ECHOES OF KATYN] 43 
(Wojciech Materski et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter KATYN: DOCUMENTS 
OF A CRIME]. 
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in German camps, and forensic doctors—were dispatched to the 
Katyn Forest; they all confirmed the terrible truth.6 
On April 15, 1943, in response to the German revelation, Radio 
Moscow published a communiqué from the Soviet Information Bureau 
that expressed outrage, blamed the Germans for the massacre of 
Polish officers, and promised punishment of “the German-Fascist 
murderers” for this crime.7 The very first paragraph, implying that 
Germany’s propaganda offensive was an effort to provoke the USSR, 
establishes the key argument about German responsibility for the 
crime: 
In the past two or three days Goebbels’s slanderers have been 
spreading vile fabrications alleging that Soviet authorities 
effected a mass shooting of Polish officers in the spring of 1940, 
in the Smolensk area. In launching this monstrous invention, 
the German-Fascist scoundrels do not hesitate at the most 
unscrupulous and base lie in their attempt to cover up crimes 
which, as has now become evident, were perpetrated by 
themselves.8 
The second paragraph of the communiqué, which also appeared in 
press publications, is also extremely important. This paragraph 
foreshadows the future construction of a fraudulent version of the 
events that the Soviet Union and its communist allies developed. The 
Soviet Union officially declared: 
The German-Fascist reports on this subject leave no doubt as to 
the tragic fate of the former Polish POWs who in 1941 were 
engaged in construction work in areas west of Smolensk and 
who, along with many Soviet people, residents of the Smolensk 
region, fell into the hands of the Soviet Fascist hangmen in the 
summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the 
Smolensk area.9 
 
6. H.R. REP. No. 2430, at 35–38 (1952).  
7. KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 306–07 (Anna M. Cienciala, 
Natalia S. Lebedeva & Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna 
M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans., 2007) (presenting Document 102 
titled “Communiqué Issued by the Sovinformburo Attacking the 
German ‘Fabrications’ about the Graves of Polish Officers in the Katyn 
Forest”). 
8. See id. at 306. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, 
at 44–45. 
9. KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 306. However, 
the text refrains from giving a detailed reconstruction of the fate of the 
Poles. Instead, the text basically deals with the crimes of the Nazis and 
of their taking of the captives to slavery in the summer of 1941, rather 
than a particular murder of Polish prisoners of war. Clearly, the authors 
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This communiqué gave birth to the false Soviet version of the 
murder of Polish prisoners of war, which ultimately become the Katyn 
lie.10 
II. Reactions to the Discoveries at Katyn 
The German announcement in April 1943 about the discovery in 
the Katyn Forest led the Polish government, which already had 
evidence of the Soviet guilt, to consider the German version of events 
as the most probable explanation and to attempt to clarify the fate of 
the Poles through international institutions and their own studies. On 
April 17, 1943, the Polish government asked the International Red 
Cross in Bern to investigate the matter.11 At this time, the focus of 
the press was not on the crime itself, but on the German efforts to 
benefit from the crime.12 
Days later, the Soviet newspaper Pravda attacked Poland for 
asking the International Red Cross to investigate and for cooperating 
with the German provocateurs from the Goebbels group.13 In contrast, 
the Polish attitude was very restrained. The Polish government 
withdrew its request to the International Red Cross under pressure 
from Winston Churchill, who echoed the concerns of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.14 During the remaining years of World War II and after its 
completion, the United States and Great Britain followed a policy of 
concealing the truth and pushing the Katyn problem aside, laying the 
foundation of Anglo-American policy towards the Katyn crime.  
Unlike the Polish government, the Soviet government acted 
decisively and ruthlessly. On April 25, 1943, the Soviet government, 
 
(not yet familiar with all the strengths of the opponent) were afraid of 
being called to provide details. Yet, the conclusion about the murder of 
the officers appears irresistible to readers. The Soviets were not 
prepared for this situation. This development probably encouraged them 
to emphasize the topic of German provocation, not the murder itself, 
and to use very aggressive rhetoric. 
10. In terms of language,”Katyn lie” is a structure analogous to that of 
Auschwitz—each name designates a specific historical phenomenon. 
11. The Katyn Massacre, WWII Behind Closed Doors, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/katyn-massacre.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013).  
12. See ADAM MOSZYNSKI, LISTA KATYŃSKA : JEŃCY OBOZÓV KOZIELSK, 
OSTASZKÓW, STAROBIELSK, ZAGINIENI W ROSJI SOWIECKIEJ 1988−89 
(1982); ALAN PAUL, KATYŃ: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND SEEDS OF POLISH 
RESSURECTION 237–38 (2003).  
13. See The Katyn Massacre, WWII Behind Closed Doors, supra note 11. 
14. See id. See also TADEUSZ CIEŚLAK ET AL., SPRAWA POLSKA W CZASIE 
DRUGIEJ WOJNY ŚWIATOWEJ NA ARENIE MIĘDZYNARODOWEJ : ZBIÓR 
DOKUMENTÓWT 347–48 (1965). 
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based on the belief that the Polish government supported the German 
efforts to shift the German responsibility for the Katyn crime to the 
USSR, broke relations with Poland.15 In the subsequent months, the 
Soviets began preparations for installation of the communist regime in 
Poland and focused on developing a very complex structure of forgery, 
building a legend of the German crime against the Poles.16 These 
efforts were designed to legitimize the Katyn lie in international 
public opinion. 
III. Fabricating History at Katyn 
The fabrication of the fundamental lies is well known today 
thanks to Russian researchers’ work with documents from the Russian 
archives (mainly the State Archive of the Russian Federation and, to 
a lesser extent, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), 
which Natalia Lebedeva and Wojciech Materski have already 
discussed in great detail.17 The Polish public may now access these 
documents thanks to a team working under the leadership of 
Lebedeva and Materski.18 Original documents are available to 
 
 15. See EDWARD J. ROZEK, ALLIED WARTIME DIPLOMACY: A PATTERN IN 
POLAND 127−28 (1958). Molotov wrote a letter to the Polish 
Ambassador in the USSR regarding Poland’s “slanderous campaign.” 
The letter concluded by stating that “the present Government of 
Poland, having slid down the path of accord with Hitler’s Government, 
ha[d] actually discontinued Allied relations with the U.S.S.R., and ha[d] 
adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.” Id. 
16. See id. at 133−35. In an effort to establish “a strong and independent 
Poland” with “a government friendly to them,” the Soviets pursued 
their own investigation of the Katyn massacre, propagated official and 
media reports regarding Germany’s responsibility, created a Polish 
Army that was politically controlled by the Soviets, and raised 
underground organizations. The Soviets’ actions were “so effectively 
propagandized that it misled Western public opinion as to the real 
Soviet objectives.” Id. 
17. See, e.g., Natalia S. Lebedeva, Komisja Specjalna I Jej Przewodniczący 
Burdenko, in ZBRODNIA KATYŃSKA MIĘDZY PRAWDĄ I KŁAMSTWEM 
56−101 (2008); Wojciech J. Materski, From the Beginning of a 
Propaganda War About the Katyn Massacre: Soviet Special Commission 
(The Commission Burdenko), in REPRESJE SOWIECKIE WOBEC NARODÓW 
EUROPY 1944-1956, at 20−28 (Dariusz Rogut & Arkadiusz Adamczyk 
eds., 2005). 
18. The edited versions of the “preliminary investigation” of Merkulov-
Krugłowa and the so called “Burdenko Commission” are contained in 
Katyń: Dokumenty Zbrodni (Katyn: Documents of a Crime), volume 4. 
Some of the edited documents are quoted directly from the originals, but 
the editors, Lebdeva and Materski, have reordered them to represent the 
historiography. 
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researchers on site in Moscow, and I had the opportunity to review 
them.19 
To construct a detailed, falsified contra-argument to the German 
accusation to prove German responsibility for the Katyn crime, the 
Soviets took advantage of the moment when the Soviet Army 
regained the Smolensk territory at the end of September 1943. 
Analyzing authorship of the Soviet-developed Katyn lie and the 
fabrication of evidence for the internal investigation purposes is 
complex. On September 22, 1943, when the Red Army was “30-35 km 
[outside] of Katyn,” Chief of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central 
Committee of the VCP (b), Georgi Alexandrov, wrote to the secretary 
of the Central Committee Andrei Shcherbakov, pointing out the need 
for “preparatory steps to expose the German provocation” and 
proposing the establishment of a special committee consisting of 
representatives from the Extraordinary State Commission for the 
Investigation of Crimes of the German-Fascists and their 
Accomplices.20 The Politburo of the VCP (b), the highest political 
authority of the USSR, decided to implement the general plan 
Alexandrov had proposed.21 However, the Politburo made some 
modifications. Namely, it limited the first phase of work exclusively to 
the activities of special security services and it designated the work as 
secret.22 Only later did the Politburo allow other institutions to join 
the investigation.23 This strategy ensured that the security apparatus 
of the Soviet state shaped a key part of the Katyn investigation. This 
delay of civilian access to and investigation of the crime scene 
 
19. The opportunity to access documents of team 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6 
(Krugłov-Merkulov Commission) and inv. 114, vol. 8 (Burdenko 
Commission) at the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii 
(GARF) was of key significance [hereinafter GARF Documents]. For 
help during my query in Moscow, I would like to thank Hieronim Grala, 
Magdalene Gumkowska and all sympathetic Russian people. See also 
ArcheoBiblioBase: Archives in Russia: B-1, INT’L INST. OF SOC. HIST. 
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.iisg.nl/abb/rep/B-1.tab1.php (for a 
description of GARF and its archives). 
20. KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 121. See also KATYN: 
A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226−27. 
21. KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226−29 
(describing the implementation and scope of “the Special State 
Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the 
Shooting of the Polish Prisoners of War by the German Fascist Invaders 
in the Katyn Forest,” more commonly known as the Burdenko 
Commission). 
22. See GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE OF 1940: 
TRUTH AND MEMORY 136–38 (2005) (recounting the formation of the 
secret Soviet commission to investigate the massacre). 
23. Id. at 139 (recounting the introduction of outside parties to the 
investigation). 
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regarding the Soviet secret police’s activity suggests that the secret 
police were better suited for operational front-line work and indicates 
a limited trust towards civilian investigation.  
For these reasons, there was a delay in granting Nikolai 
Burdenko, a member of the Extraordinary State Commission, access 
to the Katyn site. Burdenko requested permission to begin conducting 
fieldwork on September 27, just two days after the entry of the Red 
Army to Smolensk.24 He and his infamous committee appeared on the 
crime scene several weeks later. The NKVD and the People’s 
Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) effectively took full control 
over the initially weak coordination of the investigation. Certain 
initial indecisiveness as to the tactics of investigation may have 
resulted from the unusual nature, even by Soviet standards, of the 
crimehcommitted. 
The nervous Politburo decision-makers who approved the death 
order of the Polish officers in March 1940 were pushing for quick and 
decisive action at the expense of methodical and professional 
investigation. The officers who carried out the death orders from 
NKVD Chief Lavrenty Beria hastened to camouflage their crimes.25 
Even trusted members of the scientific establishment of the party, 
including Burdenko, were excluded.26 Joseph Stalin eventually 
endorsed the preparation and manipulation of the crime scene.27 
As a result of these efforts, it was the murderers of the Polish 
officers who had the first opportunity to conduct a preliminary 
investigation of the Katyn crime; this laid the groundwork for further 
concealment. In September and October 1943, NKVD and NKGB 
officers from headquarters in Moscow and from the NKVD Board of 
the Smolensk Oblast arrived at the crime scene. These were the very 
same people who best knew about the murders, because they 
participated in them. Leonid Rajchman, a head of counterintelligence 
of the NKGB, commanded the initial operations in the Katyn region. 
Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Sergei Krugłow and 
People’s Commissar of State Security Vsevolod Merkulov guided and 
oversaw the whole operation from Moscow. Both men were members 
of the “troika” the NKVD designated to implement the Katyn order 
on March 5, 1940.28 The two of them made several on-site inspections 
in 1943.29 
 
24. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226. See 
also GARF Documents, supra note 19, doc. 38, at 122. 
25. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227.  
26. See id. at 228.  
27. Cf. id. at 228–29 (indicating the top Soviet officials agreed to share the 
Burdenko report as an official investigative report). 
28. Cf.INESSA JAŻBOROWSKA, ANATOLIJ JABŁOKOW & JURIJ ZORIA, 
KATÝN:ZBRODNIA CHRONIONA TAJEMNICĄ PAŃSTWOWĄ 285–86 (1998). 
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From the beginning of October 1943 to January 1944, officers of 
the NKVD and NKGB made efforts to hide the truth about the 
crimes and create a false picture of the fate of Polish prisoners of war. 
Operational activities of the officers under Krugłow and Merkulov, 
partially described later as “the initial investigation into the so-called 
Katyn matter” involved, inter alia: 1) securing the site of a crime and 
concealment of bodies from outsiders; 2) opening, between October 
and December 1943, the pits with bodies; and 3) preparing evidence 
for the future “exhumations” in order to draw manipulated 
conclusions about innocence and guilt.30 The second task involved the 
fabrication of documents with dates from the second half of 1940 and 
first half of 1941, demonstrating the Soviet attempts to show that the 
Polish victims were still alive during that time frame. The fabricated 
documents were slipped into the corpses to be later “discovered” as 
evidence of German guilt.31 These actions, which rank among the 
most secret and arcane of the secret service, were very enigmatically 
incorporated in the report on the outcome of the investigative 
committee led by Krugłow and Merkulov.32 Such conduct is clear from 
the analysis of documents at the Russian archives and has been 
confirmed by the Military’s Prosecutor General of Russia.33 
The main focus of the Krugłow-Merkulov team was, however, the 
collection of live testimony—that is collecting false testimony in 
writing, preparing witnesses to confirm the false version of events, and 
ruthlessly eliminating any witnesses who would dare to proclaim the 
truth. Of interest were people with knowledge of the circumstances of 
 
The specific contribution of individual officers is visible in the files 
“Investigation of Merkulov and Kruglov,” Государственный архив 
Российской Федерации (ГАРФ) (GARF). In fact, the investigation 
dealt with the work of two departments, whose work was coordinated by 
the semi-official inter-ministerial “committee” of Merkulov and Kruglov. 
29. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227. 
30. See id. at 227–28.  
31. The record shows for example, a paper written by Stanislaw Kuczynski 
on June 20, 1941, which was evidently added. Kuczynski did not die in 
Katyn. Burdenko Commission expert Zubkov Konstantin cited other 
“discovered” papers from the exhumation (for example, the cited piece 
of the body No. 53).See Lebiediewa, supra note 17, at 65–67; GARF 
Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 9, k. 6–8. 
32. See Lebedeva, supra note 17, at 64–65 (stating that Krugłow and 
Merkulov’s work was described in a way that clarified that the Germans 
were deployed in Katyn Forest and were responsible for the crime). 
33. See id. at 65. The General Military Prosecutor of the Russian 
Federation has obtained evidence in this case from those directly 
involved in the forgery. 
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the crime as well as those who had nothing to do with it.34 The 
favorite and frequently used method was to intimidate and blackmail 
the targeted persons by threatening them with accusations of 
collaboration with the Germans during the occupation.35 
NKGB authorities working on the 1943-1944 preliminary 
investigation took advantage of the military counterintelligence 
investigations by SMERSH that focused on charges of collaboration 
with the Germans that began even before their arrival in the Katyn 
region.36 It should be remembered that Soviet citizens who were at 
risk of being accused of collaboration with the Nazis were usually 
willing to bend to the will of their interrogators from the triumphant 
Soviet state.37 At the same time, investigators gathered evidence of 
people whose authentic but partial knowledge of the conditions under 
German occupation would, when placed in the right context, serve to 
build the falsified version of events. Force was typically applied 
towards persons who had previously been called as witnesses by the 
German and the international commissions.38 These people were 
forced to change their testimony.39 
In the arsenal of their measures, the terror of isolation played an 
important role. People either succumbed to the NKVD-NKGB 
demands or were isolated from the world, and if still resistant, were 
physically “liquidated.”40 After softening potential witnesses with 
brutal methods, the NKVD-NKGB interrogated nearly 100 people and 
verified an additional seventeen statements for the Extraordinary 
 
34. See Inessa Jażborowska & Anatolij Jabłokow, Katynskoje 
priestuplenije:baromietr sostojanija prawa w czełowieczeskom 
izmierienii, in MIEŻDU PROSZŁYM I BUDUSZCZIM264 (1999). Range of 
genuine knowledge about the crime of “locals” witnesses should not be 
overestimated. See also KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra 
note 7, at 227 (recounting that “witnesses” who had worked for the 
Germans in Smolensk were threatened with the death penalty for 
collaborating with the enemy, and thus “agreed to say whatever they 
were told”).  
35. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227. 
36. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 
262–63, 255–60. The original connection with SMERSH during the 
massacre investigation is not obvious in my opinion. 
37. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227. 
38. See Milena Sterio, Katyn Forest Massacre: Of Genocide, State Lies, and 
Secrecy, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615, 621 (2012). 
39. See, e.g., Misinformation: The Key to Soviet Policy, 
http://www.pomniksmolensk.pl/news.php?readmore=2395 (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2013). 
40. See Lebedeva, supra note 17, at 62 (discussing the “single cell” and 
“liquidation”). 
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State Commission.41 The activity of the Soviet security apparatus 
consisted of collecting interviews and compiling material evidence, 
such as German leaflets from 1943, which were then widely 
disseminated as the documentation of the Commission.42 
Reporting on the overall investigative work is not at this point 
necessary because, fortunately, many researchers have already 
addressed this issue.43 However, it should be emphasized that while 
collecting testimonies, the investigators simultaneously were preparing 
selected persons for “live” testimony in the future. For example, the 
NKGB-NKVD forced an important witness, Parfion Kisielow, to 
revoke his testimony from 1943 in front of foreign journalists. His case 
typified the phenomenon of “inverted” witnesses.44 The testimony of 
Boris Bazilevsky, deputy mayor of Smolensk during the German 
occupation, offers another example of careful witness preparation by 
the Krugłow-Merkulov team. Bazilevsky presented a complex 
“legend” about his connection to the Katyn case and became a 
member of a small group of Soviet witnesses during the Nuremberg 
Trial.45 
The findings of the Krugłow-Merkulov team known as “The 
Special Committee Composed of Representatives of Relevant Bodies” 
in the crucial period from October 5, 1943 to January 10, 1944, were 
summarized in the Information on the Results of a Preliminary 
Investigation into the So-Called Katyn Matter(Information of a 
Preliminary Investigation).46 This document, signed by the two above-
mentioned individuals,47 concludes:  
 
 
 
 
41. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k. 1. 
The Commission’s report on this time period (through January 10) 
indicates that ninety-five witnesses were called and a few days later 
Krugłow discussed ninety-three interviews. In addition, the committee 
had collected seventeen statements from “people who have come 
forward,” or, as far as I understand, have come up with their own 
initiative to clarify in writing. 
42. See id.  
43. Natalia Lebedeva and Wojciech Materski provide the most complete 
description of the work of both committees (ministerial and state). 
44. See Misinformation: The Key to Soviet Policy, supra note 39. 
45. See Nuremberg Trial, Proceedings vol. 17 (July 1, 1946) (transcript of 
Boris Bazilevsky testifying as a witness). 
46. KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 227. 
47. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k. 1–53. 
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1. The Polish prisoners of war were working on a road 
construction project from the spring of 1940 to June 1941 
(that is until the beginning of the Soviet-German war) west of 
Smolensk.48 
2. The prisoners of war were captured by the Germans in late 
August and September 1941.49 
3. The shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the autumn of 1941 
in the Katyn Forest was carried out by an “unknown German 
military institution” that was stationed in a dacha in “Kozy 
Gory” until the end of September 1943. Colonel Ahrens 
commanded the unit; his closest associates and accomplices in 
this crime were Lieutenant Rechst and Second Lieutenant 
Hott.50 
4. After the shooting of the prisoners of war on orders from     
Berlin in the autumn of 1941, Germany undertook proactive 
efforts to assign their despicable crimes to the Soviet power.51 
Next, the NKVD-NKGB stressed the fact that the Germans also 
killed 500 Russian prisoners of war who were digging the Katyn 
graves.52 With outright hypocrisy the committee emphatically 
concluded that the Germans murdered the Soviet prisoners of war to 
cover up German crimes and as part of the German “planned policy 
of extermination of the ‘inferior’ Slavic nations.”53 The Katyn lie, 
made possible by the mystification of the crime by the NKVD-NKGB 
and the report of the Krugłow-Merkulov committee, became the 
official position of the Soviet state.  
The Information of a Preliminary Investigation did not signify 
the conclusion of activities of the Krugłow-Merkulov team. For 
example, a document entitled A Supplement to the Information of S. 
Krugłow on the Results of Preliminary Investigation on the Katyn 
Massacre Dated 18 January 1944 summarizes successive 
 
48. The Truth About Katyn: Report of The Special Commission for 
Ascertaining And Investigating The Circumstances of The Shooting of 
Polish Officer Prisoners by The German-Fascist Invaders in The Katyn 
Forest, SOVIET WAR NEWS WEEKLY (supplement), Jan. 24, 1944, at 1–2 
[hereinafter The Truth About Katyn], available at 
http://libraries.ucsd.edu/speccoll/DigitalArchives/d804_r9-t78-
1944/d804_r9-t78-1944.pdf. 
49. See id. at 2–3. 
50. See id.  
51. See id. at 4. 
52. See id. at 7.  
53. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k. 
1952–53. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 162. 
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achievements. Merkulov and Krugłow state in the document, citing 
data obtained from the Board of Foreign Intelligence of the General 
Staff of the Red Army, that “this unknown German military 
institution [under the command of ‘Arnes,’ actually Friedrich Ahrens, 
listed above]in the German Army had a staff of 537 on the 
construction battalion.”54 The Soviets used this information to provide 
an altered account of the Katyn case at Nuremberg with disastrous 
results.  
In the future, adjustments to the “reconstruction of the events” 
were superficial and made only in exceptional circumstances when 
necessitated by situations where defending the detail was too harmful 
for the overall consistency of the forgery and lie. For example, the 
original dates of “the end of August and September 1941” as a 
possible date of crime were changed to the “fall of 1941.” Such 
manipulation clearly indicates the decisive role of the Krugłow-
Merkulov committee in the construction and management of the 
Katyn lie. 
The completion of the first phase of the Krugłow-Merkulov 
investigation on January 10, 1944, and the completion of the drafting 
of the report just two days later was not accidental and was logically 
placed within the chronology of the construction of the Katyn lie. 
Since then, the information and materials gathered by this committee 
were to be used by an official state commission on the investigation of 
the Katyn crime. The formulation of final conclusions55 on January 
12, 1944, even before the end of operations by the security committee, 
clearly indicates that from the outset these conclusions were regarded 
as a guideline on the matter for the state commission and for the 
general public.  
IV. The Katyn Lie as Propaganda for the Soviet 
State: The Burdenko Commission 
At a meeting in Moscow of the Extraordinary State Commission 
on January 12, 1944, (more than three months after Nikolai 
Burdenko’s request to start an investigation), a Special Commission 
for the Findings and Examination of the Circumstances Surrounding 
the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest 
(near Smolensk) of the Prisoners of War(the Burdenko Commission), 
was set up and its composition was established.56 
The Burdenko Commission was formed by a resolution, signed by 
President of the Extraordinary State Commission, Nikolai Szwernik, 
who also acted as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the 
 
54. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 7, k. 1–9. 
55. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 227. 
56. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 39. 
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VCP (b).57 The Politburo approved the resolution without 
amendment and it was noted in the relevant protocol on January 13, 
1944.58 
In the preparation of this document, Andrei Wyszynski prepared 
a preliminary draft, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lavrenty Beria gave it 
the shape of a politically “mature” working draft, and Stalin approved 
it.59 It should be noted that Molotov, after consultation with Beria, 
made changes to the proposed composition of the committee Stalin 
had approved.60 The composition of the Burdenko Commission 
included Nikolai Burdenko, member of the Academy of Science, was 
chairman of the committee; Alexei Tolstoy; Nikolai Metropolitan; 
General Alexander Gundorow, Chairman of the General Pan Slavic 
Committee; Sergei Kolesnikov, Chairman of the Executive Committee 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent; Vladimir Potemkin, People’s 
Commissar of Education RFSRS Academician; Lieutenant General 
Yefim Smirnov, Head of the Main Military-Sanitary Board of the Red 
Army; and Riodon Melnikov, Chairman of the Smolensk Regional 
Executive Committee of the VCP (b).61 
The activities of the Burdenko Commission can be recreated 
thanks to documents from a briefcase stored in the Russian archives 
and extracted from oblivion by Russian researchers. These documents 
not only provide insight into the results of the Burdenko Commission 
but also into the behind-the-scene works of the Burdenko 
Commission. The Burdenko Commission held six meetings, including 
two on January 18 at 11:00 a.m. and 11:50 p.m.62 The Commission 
announced the results of its work on January 24, 1944.63 
The inaugural meeting of the Burdenko Commission in Moscow 
left no doubt as to the direction in which the Commission would go. 
Deputy Commissioner of Internal Affairs Sergei Krugłow took part in 
 
57. See Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyn Massacre 441 (undated), available at 
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s5_9143.pdf (explaining the 
establishment of the Burdenko Commission). 
58. KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 171.  
59. See Lebdevea, supra note 47, at 441 (noting that Molotov and Beria 
made proposals to the resolution and Stalin had to approve such 
changes). 
60. See id. (“Molotov, with Beria’s consent, proposed including in the 
commission the chair and another member of the Central Directorate of 
the Union of Polish Patriots, which had been created in Moscow.”). 
61. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at227–
28.Alexei Tolstoy was a famous writer of genuine achievements is one of 
the luminaries of Russian literature. 
62. See id. at 318. 
63. See id. at 319 (reprinting the Commission’s report).  
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its meeting on January 13, 1944.64 Krugłow presented the findings of 
his commission, and these findings were accepted members by the 
members of the Burdenko Commission without the slightest 
discussion, as evidenced by transcripts of the proceedings.65 Krugłow, 
focusing on the document Information, emphasized the evidence 
gathered from witnesses. Burdenko, Tolstoy, Metropolitan, Potemkin, 
Gundorow, and Makarov all spoke at the meeting.66 Discussion was 
limited to neutral comments on the Krugłow information; an 
exchange between Tolstoy, Krugłow, and Burdenko is illustrative:  
TOLSTOY: The most basic statement is that the Poles were still 
alive after our withdrawal from Smolensk. 
KRUGŁOW: Very many witnesses testify that in autumn 1943 
Germans escorted small groups of Poles, about 30-40 each in 
vehicles to the Katyn Forest.  
TOLSTOY: I think that at upon opening of the graves there 
should certainly be some documents, cards, notes, letters dated 
later than 1940. 
KRUGŁOW: Later than the spring of 1940; for sure it will be 
representative material evidence. . . . 
BURDENKO: As we heard from a speech by Comrade Krugłow, 
this matter is serious, and I propose to discuss the plan of our 
work.67 
There was no discussion of essential questions on the Katyn 
massacre of primary interest to the world opinion either in this 
meeting or at any other meeting. Further deliberations that day 
related only to the technical and organizational aspects of work in 
Smolensk and Katyn.68 
The work of the Burdenko Commission consisted of collecting 
“evidence” for developing and supporting the fabricated version of the 
German responsibility for the murder of the Poles. The Commission 
did not investigate who perpetrated the crime. As explicitly stated in 
the name of this body, the Commission only investigated the 
“circumstances of the shooting by the German-Fascist invaders of the 
 
64. See id. at 227–28. 
65. See id. at 228.  
66. See id. at 227–28. 
67. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 1937–
58. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 181. 
68. See id.  
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Katyn Forest.”69 Gathering evidence in practice was limited to the 
recording of evidence gathered by the Krugłow committee. Using 
previously prepared materials extracted from the Katyn pits and 
witness testimonies selected from among those previously prepared by 
the NKVD-NKGB, the Burdenko Commission was able to issue its 
ruling within ten days. 
A brief period of work and reliance on the report presented by the 
security apparatus does not mean, however, that the activity of the 
Commission had a completely fictitious character, limited just to 
signing in Moscow of protocols prepared by others. Members of the 
commission, with the help and under the supervision of the NKVD-
NKGB, carried out fieldwork, including the inspection of death pits, 
visual inspection of bodies, and questioning witnesses.70 At a meeting 
on January 18, 1944, at 11:00 a.m. it was decided that all members of 
the Commission would travel to the excavation site in the Katyn 
Forest in order to see the graves and determine how to prepare for 
the exhumation of corpses.71 Since January 14, excavations were 
conducted there under the direction of Krugłow, with Rodion 
Melnikova from the Commission.72 At the second meeting on the same 
day, which began ten minutes before midnight and in the presence of 
Victor Prozorowski and Victor Siemionowski, the Commission decided 
on a further division of tasks between its members into two groups: 1) 
excavation of corpses and forensic medical examination and 2) 
interviewing witnesses and systematization.73 
Holding two meetings in one day proves that the pace of the 
implementation of the tasks was of great importance. The exhaustive 
schedule of the working day from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and from 4:00 
p.m. to 11:00 p.m.74 also proves this point. While urgency was real, 
the involvement of the members ranged from serious (Burdenko, 
Potemkin, and Tolstoy) to minor (Smirnov and Gundurow). In the 
next few days, members of the Commission were overseeing 
exhumations with the participation of experts in forensic medicine 
and interviewed witnesses. On January 19, 1944 in Smolensk, the 
Burdenko Commission held its fourth meeting, interviewing and 
 
69. GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE OF 1940: TRUTH, 
JUSTICE AND MEMORY 137 (2005). 
70. See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 314–
18(reprinting the “Report of the Polish Red Cross Technical 
Commission on Its Work in Katyn,” which describes the Commission’s 
research at Katyn).  
71. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 64. 
72. See id. k.63–64. 
73. See id. at k. 96–97. 
74. See id. 
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summarizing the results of the exhumation work, including forensic 
medicine experts.75 The fifth meeting was held on January 20, in 
Smolensk.76 During the meeting, Burdenko stated, “We finished 
interviewing witnesses, but we have to do another job. . . . Our 
planned work is coming to an end. We should hurry up with the 
audio recording. You have to choose the material, prepare it.”77 This 
meant the end of the basic phase of “investigative” operations and 
moving to a stage of preparing the conclusions that were to be used as 
propaganda material. Accordingly, from January 13–20, 1944, the 
commission performed a series of labor-intensive activities. Regardless 
of the effort invested in the work carried out by the Burdenko 
Commission, a complex investigation and reconstruction of the events 
surrounding the murder of the Polish officers in such a short time was 
impossible.  
Furthermore, the investigation was not conducted independently. 
The Commission used material gathered earlier by the perpetrators of 
the crime, exclusively and without objection. Information from the 
exhumation work conducted by the Commission on January 14, 1944, 
was based on the material prepared by the NKVD-NKGB. 
Preparations included tossing fake evidence into the pits of the dead.78 
The Burdenko Commission chose witnesses from among those 
questioned by the NKVD-NKGB, focusing merely on “jointly” 
selecting the “most useful,” while ignoring the rest of the earlier 
testimonies and not calling any new witnesses. In practice, this meant 
that the Commission only heard from people “prepared” by the Soviet 
apparatus of coercion.79 It should be noted that the relationship 
between the Krugłow-Merkulov team vis-a-vis the Burdenko 
Commission reversed the normal policy for investigations—an 
investigative organ should secure evidence for the prosecuting body, 
but in this case, the prosecuting body secured the evidence for the 
investigative organ. The organ conducting the preliminary 
investigation imposed its version of events upon the prosecuting body, 
and the prosecuting organ only helped in its development. During the 
preparatory proceedings, a verdict was formed first, and then 
Commission wrote its justification. The Commission only helped write 
the justification; officers of the Krugłow’s Security Ministry 
 
75. See id. at k.146–48. 
76. See id. at k.179–80. 
77. See id. at k. 146.  
78. See INESSA JAŻBOROWSKA, ANATOLIJ JABŁOKOW & JURIJ ZORIA, supra 
note 28, at 233–34, 258. See also JOLANTA ADAMSKA, ANDRZEJ 
PRZEWOŹNIK , Katyń. Zbrodnia-Prawda-Pamięć, at 359–60 (2010).  
79. Compare GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, 
k. 1–53 and unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 7, k. 1– 9 with GARF Documents, 
supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 92–110, 111–42, 146–78.  
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participated in the investigation and complemented the Commission’s 
work by supplementing their earlier Information of a Preliminary 
Investigation. 
In light of the observation that the Burdenko Commission served 
a subsidiary and secondary role to the Krugłow team, a question 
arises as to the purpose of interviewing the same witnesses and 
searching the same mass graves as in the “preliminary investigation.” 
In light of the weak logic of the construction of the Katyn lie, such 
activities make perfect sense. The work of the Commission was not 
used for reaching the truth about Katyn, or even for inventing a false 
version of events, as this was already done. The Commission was to 
prepare materials on Katyn for the purpose of Soviet propaganda. 
Documentation was to be presented by persons with prestige and 
authority higher than the NKVD, including forensic experts and 
scientists using professional terminology. In short, the findings of the 
Burdenko Commission offered propaganda material of a higher quality 
than that produced by the security apparatus. Some of the members 
of the Commission were likely concerned about the use of their 
reputation for such purposes and, hence, insisted on carrying out work 
at the crime scene and interviewing witnesses before signing off on the 
final documents.  
The crowning of the work of the Burdenko Commission was the 
preparation of the communiqué and presentation for the press 
conference. The Commission, recognizing an urgent need to present 
material to the international community, organized a press conference 
for mostly foreign journalists, held on January 22, 1944, even though 
the Commission had yet to officially publish its findings from the 
investigation.80 Potemkin and Tolstoy conducted the conference, with 
the participation of Metropolitan and Burdenko.81 During the initial 
part of the conference, the journalists were given a long statement, 
which included the important conclusion: “It can be considered as 
established that in the autumn, in August to September 1941, 
Germany shot in Kozie Gory Polish prisoners of war.”82 In the second 
part, intended only for foreign correspondents, which in practice 
meant the Anglo-Saxons, the journalists had the opportunity to ask 
questions.83 During the conference, testimonies of witnesses were 
presented; some witnesses appeared personally.84 
 
80. Fischer, supra note 2.  
81. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 207–35. 
82. See id. at k. 207–26 (initial part). 
83. See id. at k. 227–35 (part for foreign journalists). 
84. See id. at k. 237–57 (hearings before the commission in presence of 
foreign journalists). 
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In addition to false testimonies presented by Bazilevsky, Parfiona 
Kisielowa, and women employed in the “dacha” in the Katyn Forest, 
the Commission emphasized the prominence of “the father Alexander 
Ogloblin” as a witness “presented by the first hierarchy of the 
Orthodox Metropolitan Nikolai.”85 Ogloblin was a priest from the 
church in the village Kurpino, situated in an area of the Katyn 
Forest.86 This testimony was a creative contribution of the Burdenko 
Commission to the propaganda of the Katyn lie. In addition to 
questions, reporters were shown an exhibition of objects excavated 
from the death pits. Undoubtedly, this was an effort to appeal to the 
reporters’ emotions and possibly cause them to make the following 
inference: since the Soviets were showing evidence of these crimes, 
they could not have committed them.87 The entire show was the joint 
work of the Krugłow-Merkulov and Burdenko teams. Thanks to this 
conference, world public opinion absorbed the Soviet version of 
events, not only through the Soviet mass media but also through 
foreign correspondents in the USSR.  
It is likely that organizers of the conference also wanted to 
present the world with details of the Katyn lie that were, up to that 
point, held behind closed doors. No one considered the possibility that 
the international community would contest the Katyn lie. However, 
the Soviets wanted an opportunity to safely test the details and 
possible weak points of the forgery. It was the last moment for the 
Soviets, at a relatively low cost, to make additions and even make 
some adjustments in the constructed history. For example, an 
American journalist asked if the Committee noticed that the victims 
were dressed too heavily in sweaters and warm underwear for the 
August and September weather.88 Potemkin replied that cool nights 
begin in September (ignoring August), and Tolstoy tortuously 
explained that the men had no other clothing.89 Perhaps this exchange 
 
85. See id. at k. 223–24. 
86. See The Truth About Katyn, supra note 48, at 4.  
87. See id. at 9, 12. Recalling his visit to the Katyn graves, Doctor Zhukov 
said, “As a result of my visit to the excavation site, I became firmly 
convinced that a monstrous crime had been committed by the 
Germans.” Id. at 9. The Special Commission then stated, “The 
conclusions drawn from the evidence given by witnesses . . . are 
completely confirmed by the material evidence and documents 
excavated from the Katyn graves.” Id. at 12.  
88. Cf. Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the 
Katyn Forest Near Smolensk, Russia: Hearing before the Select 
Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and 
Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82nd Cong. 316 (1952) 
[hereinafter Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish 
Officers]. 
89. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 228–29. 
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contributed to the replacement in subsequent Soviet documents of the 
August and September 1941 timeframe (alternatively, the end of 
August and September) with the phrase “autumn” of 1941.  
The day after the press conference, January 23, 1944, the 
Commission held its sixth meeting in Smolensk. Burdenko stated that 
“the documents found are fully convincing, and determine that the 
time of the shooting dates for the autumn of 1941.” He explained that 
the Commission had interviewed all witnesses of interest and 
summarized their testimonies. The last task for the Commission was 
to edit the already developed forensic medical material.90 Only when 
Burdenko assured the members that the final draft was almost ready 
was it possible to conclude the work in Smolensk. The Commission 
decided to hear one more witness, which was done in Smolensk on the 
same day.91 Although some Commission member suggested continuing 
work as long as possible, the Commission formally decided to extend 
the work of forensic medical experts only to January 27; the work of 
the Commission effectively ended within twenty-four hours after the 
issuance of the final communiqué. The time pressure was closely 
associated with the German dissemination, at the turn of 1944, of the 
true information about the Soviet role in the Katyn Forest massacre, 
in particular a detailed documentation prepared in 1943 in Berlin on 
the Katyn crime.92 
The fact that the Commission completed its work before the 
agreed upon date indicates that the state exerted pressure to stop 
work immediately. The records from the last meeting preceding the 
final announcement show that only some of the members of the 
Committee (including Burdenko) participated in drafting of the final 
statement,93 and it’s possible that their participation was fairly 
limited. Without a doubt, the discussion of the form and content of 
the Commission’s summary did not include all of the Commission 
members. In fact, officers of the security ministries from NKGB-
NKVD provided substantive and technical assistance to the Burdenko 
Commission in its preparation of the final text.94 
A short document entitled Forensic-Medical Expertise of the 
Katyn Graves was probably prepared in Moscow around January 23, 
1944, at the time of the meeting of the Burdenko Commission at 
 
90. See id. at k. 267–68. 
91. Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers, supra note 
94, at 246–47. 
92. See generally AMTLICHES MATERIAL ZUM MASSENMORD VON KATYN 
(1943), available at http://codoh.com/node/999. 
93. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 
267–68. 
94. See id. at k. 268. 
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Smolensk.95 Theoretically, this document was to serve as evidence for 
the Commission, which combined with other evidence allowed for 
reconstruction of the events studied. In practice, no expert could have 
evaluated this document before the formal announcement of the 
results a day later. This document included certain conclusions that 
lacked any support from the forensic medical evidence and, in fact, 
could never have resulted from the forensic evidence. For example, 
the statement that “the liquidation of Polish POWs in the Katyn 
Forest was done by [Ahrens, Rechst, and Hott] in accordance with a 
directive from Berlin”96 had nothing to do with forensic expertise. 
Conclusions formulated in this document were, in light of the 
available contemporary knowledge, far-reaching in scope, and most 
importantly were false.97 All the conclusions were designed to prove 
the thesis that the Germans were responsible for the crime against the 
Polish prisoners. The report summarized that “on the basis of 
macroscopic research it can be concluded that changes in the outside 
tissue, soft tissue and internal organs, bones, skeletal and fittings 
correspond with a period of two years.”98 This timing was designed to 
point to the years 1941 and 1942, when Katyn was in the hands of 
the Germans, not Russians.  
Generally, it can be concluded that between January 16–26, 1944, 
experts conducted actual research in the field and exhumed corpses,99 
 
95. See id. at k.193–201. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra 
note 5, at 280. At the outset of the Expertise (that is stored in a 
briefcase of the Burdenko Commission and which is actually a loose 
typescript, not a document), without any embarrassment, a reference 
was made to the conclusions of the entire Commission, which in theory 
did not yet exist. The documents could have been backdated. 
96. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 194. 
97. The categorical conclusions drawn from the available data were 
impossible considering contemporary methods. Thus the conclusions 
that were made were deliberately subordinated to the false thesis. It 
should be noted that, contrary to popular opinions, activities related to 
the inspection of the death pits and testing of the exhumed bodies could 
not—at the then existing state of knowledge—give a clear and 
unarguable answers to questions about the time of the murder of POWs, 
and so unquestionably determine the identity the perpetrators, and 
could be useful only when compared with data collected by other means. 
Earlier correct conclusions made under the auspices of the German 
investigation in 1943 stemmed more from the examination of documents 
and hearing witnesses than from medical forensic testing. 
98. See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 198. 
See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 280. 
99. Report on the Work of the Forensic Medical Experts for the Exhumation 
and Examination of Corpses of Polish Prisoners of War in Katyn 
Forest, Together with Daily Work, February 1, 1944, in KATYN: 
DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 321–23. The report stated that 
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but their findings and conclusions presented in the were unreliable. 
The conclusions of the forensic-medical experts under the leadership 
of the Chief Medical Forensic Examiner for the USSR People’s 
Commissariat of Health Victor Prozorowki, falsified the reality.100 
These falsified forensic results were included in the main report of the 
Burdenko Commission and ultimately became part of the Katyn lie. 
The Burdenko Commission issued its communiqué on January 24, 
1944. On that date, all members of the Commission formally signed 
the document. The communiqué was subsequently released on 
January 26, published in Pravda, and referenced by the Telegraph 
Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and other newspapers.101 The 
release of the communiqué on January 24, 1944, completed the basic 
work of the Commission, but Burdenko—very involved in the 
promotion of its product—continued his correspondence and, at least 
on paper, the Commission convened again many times.102 
The January 24, 1944 communiqué became the most important 
official Soviet text of the Katyn lies. It presents a full Soviet version 
of events related to the murder of Polish prisoners of war at Katyn. 
This document was frequently used to present the Soviet version of 
the Katyn crime on many occasions between the 1940s and late 
1980s.103 It was promoted in the USSR and all Eastern bloc countries, 
in particular in communist Poland.104 The communiqué often 
published in whole or in part in high-volume editions, became the 
best-known text on the Katyn lie.  
Today, it is pointless to discuss the details of this extensive, 
sinister report. In general, the content of the communiqué can is best 
summarized in several chapters that cite the testimony of witnesses 
and list fabricated documents. One of the chapters represents a report 
 
the supposed 1,380 exhumed bodies that were subjected to necropsy was 
an overestimation, or that the research performed was very sketchy. 
100. The Commission failed to produce the forensic medical expertise; it is 
impossible to question the expertise of experts working under the 
direction of Victor Prozorowki, but no doubt their knowledge was used 
in the wrong way. 
101. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 317–48. 
See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 289–317.  
102. Minutes of 28th Meeting of the Special Commission of 23 March 1944 
(from the Extraordinary State Commission), in GARF Documents, 
supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 19, k. 24–25. See also KATYN: 
DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 334–35. 
103. See Richard J. Hunter, Katyn: Old Issues Threaten Polish-Russian 
Economic and Political Relations, 17 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 288, 290–91 
(2010). 
104. Cf. id. at 290 (noting that the communiqué was translated in numerous 
languages for the widest possible dissemination). The communiqué was 
first published in Pravda, Moscow, in 1944. 
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of the forensic medical experts.105 This report is dated January 24, 
1944, from Smolensk, and is signed by five experts, headed by 
Prozorowski.106 
The “General Conclusion” summarizes the reasoning of the 
Burdenko Commission in eleven points. Of particular interest are 
points nine through eleven: 
Of all the materials available to the Special Commission—
namely, the testimony of more than 100 witnesses questioned by 
the Commission, the report of forensic-medical experts and 
material evidence recovered from the graves of the Katyn Forest 
the following conclusions can be made. . . .  
9) The data of the forensic medical expertise shows without 
any  doubt that:  
a) the executions took place in the autumn of 1941  
b) German executioners shooting the Polish prisoners of war 
used the same method of a pistol shot in the back of the 
skull that was applied in other cities such as Orel, 
Voronezh, Krasnodar, and in Smolensk as well.  
10) The conclusions of the expert witnesses and forensic-medical 
experts that the prisoners of war—Poles were shot by the 
Germans in autumn 1941 are fully confirmed by physical 
evidence and documents recovered from the graves in 
Katyn.  
11) Shooting prisoners of war - Poles in the Katyn Forest 
German fascist invaders consistently implemented their 
policy of extermination of the Slavic nations.107 
Even a cursory reading of the document shows a striking 
similarity of “understanding” between the Burdenko Commission and 
Krugłow-Merkulov findings. A more careful analysis of the final 
conclusions of the Special Commission and the full text of its 
communiqué confirms this conclusion. In all important aspects, the 
results of the Burdenko Commission replicated the results of the 
NKGB-NKVD preliminary investigation. Moreover, the communiqué 
can be considered as somewhat broadened and enriched version of the 
Krugłow-Merkulov Information of a Preliminary Investigation.  
 
105. KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 310–14. 
106. See id. at 314.  
107. See id. at 315–16.  
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V. Conclusion 
In summary, the Burdenko Commission was not able or willing to 
depart from the Krugłow-Merkulov false version of events. The 
Commission only made corrections to the legend developed by 
Krugłow and Merkulov where such corrections could improve the 
falsified evidence. In fact, the Burdenko Commission completed its 
work under the supervision and with active participation from the 
NKGB-NKVD apparatus.  
The Katyn lie survived in the USSR until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It was not until April 13, 1990, when TASS disclosed 
the true perpetrators of the Katyn crime—the Soviet NKVD. The 
president of the Russian Federation presented documents evidencing 
the responsibility of the Politburo of the VCP (b) and Joseph Stalin 
for the Katyn massacre to the president of Poland in 1992. To this 
day, many epigones of the Katyn lies, such as Yuri Muchin, maintain 
that the Germans murdered Polish officers in the Katyn forest.108 
 
 
108. See, e.g., Юрий Мухин, Антироссийская подлость (2003). 
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